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DEWEY, JOHN: Dewey and Art

the agent. Dewey would say that aesthetic experience is "ex
pressive" of those settled dispositions.
It is apparent here how a full understanding of Dewey's
view of organic unity introduces topics that, traditionally,
have not been considered especially relevant to aesthetics
proper. But recent commentators have come to regard this as
a major source of interest: Virtually the whole of Dewey's
mature work, and much of what he did earlier, is grounded on
his wider views about the aesthetics of experience. For this
Dewey has stretched not just the concept of "aesthetics" but
also "experience" far beyond its familiar connotations. "Ex
perience" for Dewey is not simply a phenomenological cate
gory. The term is a placeholder for the complex of operations
and apprehensions that occur in what he calls "the interactive
situation" -which is his way of describing the functional rela
tionship between the human organism and its environment.
All perceived qualities themselves emerge from this kind of
complex, but "pervasive qualities" in particular emerge only
when the human organism has learned to sustain a certain
range of responses (emotional as well as cognitive) throughout
the experiential process. In that case, and in the presence of
appropriate environmental conditions, the result is a particu
lar "system"-an assembly of parts connected together so
that a particular end (consummation) is attained. Dewey's fa
miliar model here is biological (as in the case of the respira
tory system of the human body, comprising the lungs and
their associated vessels and airways). But he extends the reach
of such a system beyond the boundaries of the organism
proper, to include not only external elements that temporally
coexist with the present state of the organism, but also future
conditions that are created out of tensions internal to that pre
sent state. Dewey's substantial, and controversial, claim at this
point seems to be that what emerges from this interaction
and what constitutes the entire interactive situation as an
organic unity-is more than simply the "pervasive quality"
itself: it is also a telic element within the system that orients it
toward consummatory "equilibrium," for which the agent's
immediate apprehension of intrinsic pervasive quality func
tions instrumentally as an orienting clue for conduct.
So for Dewey, what has organic unity in such cases is not a
physical artifact but a succession of interrelated events, and a
physical art object may serve as an occasion not only for con
summatory satisfaction but for a reinforcement of a specta
tor's capacity for intelligent conduct in any field of practical
inquiry. This (Dewey insists) is a central aspect of human life
that Formalists missed by cordoning off "fine art" from other
human products, and the fundamental impulse behind Dew
ey's aesthetics is to "restore the continuity" between art and
life that prevalent modernist theories had been ignoring. The
encompassing breadth of the term aesthetic in Dewey is an
indication of this. Life has real human value, Dewey would
say, insofar as it exhibits the organic unity of experience.
All this places Dewey in an interesting relationship to
recent developments in aesthetic theory. If we identify
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"modernism" with Clement Greenberg's view of a "self
critical tendency" that focuses exclusively on the intrinsic
properties of the medium, Dewey is not a modernist be
cause he does not hold that preoccupation with material
properties, apart from other practical concerns, is even pos
sible. But if we identify "postmodernism" with the Derrid
ean rejection of any fixed frame for the artwork that could
definitively set it apart from "outside" elements, then Dewey
is no postmodernist either because he holds that experience
itself does naturally exhibit structures of organic unity that
define interactive situations. Here, as Richard Shusterman
has pointed out (1992, pp. 71ff.), the contention between
Dewey and postmodernism is not over the notion of organic
unity per se but rather over the priority one should ascribe
to the experience of aesthetic richness. Dewey takes such
experience to be of supreme value for human life, and this
fact he believes should determine our critical interests in art.
His theory of organic unity is intended to provide a basic
naturalistic framework for those critical interests.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Works by Dewey

"Art as Experience." In John Dewey: The Later WOrks, 1925-1953, Vol.
10, 1934, edited by JoAnn Boydston. Carbondale: Southern illinois
University Press, 1987.
" Experience and Nature." InJohn Dewey: The Later WOrks, 1925-1953, Vol.
1, 1925, edited byJoAnn Boydston.Carbondale: Southern illinois Uni
versity Press, 1981. See " Experience, Nature, andArt," pp. 266-294.
" Human Nature and Conduct." In John Dewey: The Mt'ddle WOrks,
1899-1924, Vol. 14, 1922, edited by JoAnn Boydston, pp. 13-118.
Carbondale: Southern illinois University Press, 1983.
"QualitativeThought." In John Dewey: The Later WOrks, 1925-1953, Vol.
5, 1929-1930, edited byJoAnn Boydston, pp. 243-262. Carbondale:
Southern illinois University Press, 1984.
"The Philosophy of the Arts." In John Dewey: The Later WOrks, 19251953, Vol. 13, 1938-1939, edited by JoAnn Boydston, pp. 357-368.
Carbondale: Southern illinois University Press, 1988.
Other Sources

Aristotle. Poetics. In The Basic WOrks of Aristotle, edited by Richard
McKeon, chap. 7. NewYork: Random House, 1941.
Barnes, Albert C. "The Aesthetic Values of Painting." In The Art t'n
Pat'nting, 2d ed., pp. 34-70. NewYork: Harcourt, Brace, 1928.
Bell, Clive. Art. NewYork: Capricorn, 1958.
Danto,Arthur C. "TheAI:tworld." Journal of Pht'losophy 61, no. 19 (15
October 1964): 571-584.
Seiple, David I. "John Dewey and theAesthetics of Moral Intelligence."
Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, 1993.
Shusterman, Richard. Pragmatist Aesthetics: Living Beauty, Rethinkt'ng
Art. Oxford and Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell, 1992.
DAVID I. SEIPLE

�

Dewey and Art

Readers sympathetic to John Dewey's philosophy generally
admire his resistance to the conventional dualisms (e.g.,
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mind and body, cognition and intuition, and subjective and
objective) of the Western tradition, and often-as Stanley
Cavell (1990) put it-feel "the thrill of certain moments of
[his] writing" (p. 14). At the same time, even the most com
mitted readers find it difficult to parse Dewey's ideas about
art as expressed in Art as Experience (the book, published in
1934, revises and expands the William James Lectures he
delivered at Harvard University in 1931). The challenge re
sults partly from Dewey's circuitous argumentation, but also
from his shifting definitions of key terms: "experience," "ex
pression," "interaction," "medium," and "consummation."
It is also a consequence of the author's resolve to avoid uti
lizing normative categories, for instance, beauty, significant
form, autonomy, truth to nature (mimesis), as criteria of
aesthetic value. While they had become standard in writing
on art, over time such categories had, according to Dewey,
radically undermined our capacity to understand the way
works of art mean.
To assess and evaluate the chief claims of Art as Experience,
even in summary form, is a daunting task. I offer a critical
discussion of some key terms rooted in Dewey's treatise in
order to investigate how his aesthetics bears upon certain
themes that remain crucial for art history and criticism, in
cluding the nature of an artistic medium, the quality of aes
thetic experience in production and reception, the relation of
intention to meaning, and the activity of interpretation.
The Artistic Medium. Dewey identified continuities
where others established categorical distinctions. For him,
the fundamental reciprocity between an organism and an
environment -in which the organism comes to understand
himself and what actions and objects mean by testing their
effectiveness in overcoming obstacles it encounters to its
growth-provided a model for unifying various divisions
enacted by the Western tradition. In Art as Experience (1934),
Dewey states that he aims to "restore [the] continuity be
tween the refined and intensified forms of experience that
are works of art and the everyday events, doings, and suffer
ings that are universally recognized to constitute experi
ence" (p. 3).
Even in this preliminary statement, Dewey suggests how
his theory of art diverges from conventional accounts.
Charging that traditional aesthetics focuses on the enduring
product of artistic activity-a somewhat misleading accusa
tion-Dewey proposes that a "work" of art is not necessarily
a static object but rather a special kind of dynamic experi
ence, differing from everyday undertakings by virtue of its
special refinement or intensificadon. The "delight �f the
housewife in tending her plants" and the "intelligent me
chanic engaged in his job" exhibit the raw characteristics of
the properly aesthetic (Art as Experience, p. 5), but Dewey
values art specifically because it occasions a beholder's
apprehension of this special quality. Consequently, he often
treats the work of art either as a sign of or as a stimulus for
what he calls "an experience." What distinguishes an experi-

ence from its quotidian analogues is its "consummatory"
character-its manifestation of a pervasive, qualitative of
wholeness or completeness and a perfect adjustment of
means to ends. That fit is not so much cognitively known as
it is felt by the organism. Its aesthetic dimension can be
appreciated, though, when the affective satisfaction the ex
perience affords is subject to reflection. Indeed, "consum
mation" properly refers only to those moments in which the
organism's felt integration is complemented by a conscious
awareness of the qualitative integration it has achieved.
Careful to avoid categorizing self-reflection as a purely
intellectual or abstract operation, Dewey explains reflection's
emergence from an organic setting. Only after a develop
mental process through which the "live creature" transforms
its "blind surge[s]" or impulses into "contrived" or orches
trated undertakings (Art as Experience, p. 59) can the consum
matory phase of an interaction be consciously recognized.
This process is crucial to understanding how Dewey thinks an
individual expresses meaning through an artistic medium.
Dewey explains how the human being, constituted by
basic needs and functions no different in kind from those
common to "animal life below the human scale," is insepa
rable from an environment that, far from being considered
external to it, is rather the essential condition of life (Art as
Experience, p. 18). The animal strives for union and integra
tion with its environment. Disturbances to this harmony
create tensions that must be brought into equilibrium
through vital adaptation. Certainly, balance can simply be
restored by more or less mechanical means, such as reflexes.
But in its fullest and most significant form, stability results
from the "transformation of [mere] interaction into partici
pation and communication" (p. 22). The drive toward equi
librium requires-or perhaps we might say permits-the
conversion of raw material into media of expression:
Art is thus prefigured in the very processes of living.A bird builds its
nest and a beaver its dam when internal organic pressures cooperate
with external materials so the former are fulfilled and the latter are
transformed in a satisfying culmination . .. .All deliberation, all con
scious intent, grows out of things once performed organically
through the interplay of natural energies.. . .Art is the living and con
crete proof that man is capable of restoring consciously, and thus on
the plane of meaning, the union of sense, need, impulse and action
characteristic of the live creature.
(Art as Experience) pp. 24-25)

In this passage, "art" seems to designate processes of pro
duction that, while they may at first be carried out with
something like the live animal's absorbed but nonreflective
involvement in its activity, nonetheless issue in a satisfying
experience because they become intentionally directed. In
other words, fu1filling internal drives by transforming external
materials into media is the route to intentional expression.
"What makes a material a medium," Dewey writes, "is
that it is used to express a meaning which is other than that
which it is in virtue of its bare physical existence" (Art as
Experience, p. 201). Espousing an idea that is not incom-
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mensurate with some views articul�ted by the critic Clement
Greenberg (and later by Michael Fried), Dewey suggests
that the "causally conditioned" material of art-its literal
ness-must be transformed in order to "depict the wide and
diversified universe of animate and inanimate things" (pp.
146 and 196). To become a properly artistic medium that
"operates with full energy" (p. 197), the "contracted, flat,
uniform" surface of a canvas must be overcome or, as
Greenberg put it, "re-created." Thus, a medium is estab
lished not when the artist imprints an inert substance with a
pre-envisaged form, but when his absorbed attention to, and
manipulation of, his materials issues in a "consolidated,"
"complete," and "immediate" presentation of meaning (pp.
56, 58, and 119). Dewey's contention that only a "medium"
can convey the "immediate," as paradoxical as it sounds, is
meant to ground his aesthetics in the world, refusing the
metaphysical concept of art's existence in an ideal realm
separate from our own.
Aesthetic Experience in Production and Recep
tion. Dewey's theory of artistic media bears upon his dual

effort to (1) describe what constitutes aesthetic experience
for the artist (the producer of works of art) and the viewer
(the receiver who encounters those works) and to (2) recon
sider the conventional distinction between aesthetic and
ordinary experience.
With respect to the first task, in Dewey's terminology,
"art" refers to processes of doing or malting (production),
while "esthetic" refers to the viewer's perception (recep
tion). Yet he cautions that the distinction cannot be rigidly
maintained. Both can have a consummatory character. Art
unites the stages of production and reception, and "the artist
embodies in himself the attitude of the perceiver while he
works" (Art as Experience, p. 48). Moreover, perception is
aesthetic when a "relation to a distinct manner of activity
qualifies what is perceived" (p. 49). What makes this manner
of activity distinct is that it is "directed by intent" (p. 48).
Since the artist "selects, simplifies, clarifies, abridges, and
condenses" the means at his disposal according to his
interest, his aesthetic experience is permeated by an "ab
sorbed" sense of "conserving," "consolidating," and "accru
ing" meanings from past experience within the context of a
present directed toward the future (pp. 54 and 56).
Artists use material not merely to accomplish a set task or
to effect a predetermined end. Rather, those materials are
"incorporated" in a special way into the artwork they make
possible and are transformed into media in the process.
When means persist in-and are fulfilled by-their end, an
"integration" of a plastic medium has been achieved. This
constitutes, for Dewey, an objective standard for value in
painting. Plastic integration elicits from the beholder of the
work of art a sense of a correlative integration in her "total
set of organic responses" (Dewey, "Affective Thought,"
p. 7). The beholder, in order to "lay hold of the full import
of the work of art," must "go through in [his] own vital pro-
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cesses the processes the artist went through in producing
the work" (Art as Experience,_ p. 325). So, while the experi
ences of the artist and the viewer are not literally identical,
the latter is, in a re-creative sense, continuous with the
former.
With respect to the second task, we have seen that Dewey
averts the dilemma of distinguishing between the ordinary
and the aesthetic by denying that there is a categorical dis
tinction between them. In normal experience, we apprehend
the meaning of objects and events by assessing their signifi
cance against the background of a total situation within
which we are engaged. The aesthetic, continuous with both
organic processes as well as with quotidian life, depends
upon that basic condition for its "raw material," and "issue[s]
from [it]" (Art as Experience, pp. 11-12). Thus, the differ
ence between the ordinary and the aesthetic is one of degree.
It turns out that what differentiates the process of artistic
doing or making from everyday activities is the intensity of
"completeness of living in the experience of making and
perceiving" (Art as Experience,_ p. 26). Artworks exhibit a
fulfilling wholeness that-while sometimes experienced in
everyday activity-is intensely concentrated. In contrast to
the "disorganization" and "compartmentalization" (p. 20)
of modern, institutional life, art conveys the "immediate
sensuous experience" (p. 29) of "self-sufficiency" (p. 35).
Just as it is when we have an experience, in a work of art
there are no holes, mechanical junctions, [or] dead centers. . In a
work of art, different acts, episodes, occurrences melt and fuse into
unity, and yet do not disappear and lose their own character as they
do so. . . .This unity is constituted by a single quality that pervades the
(Art as Experience) pp. 36-37)
entire experience.
. .

Dewey singles out the critic Roger Fry to make the point
that this unity is not merely a formal property of the work of
art-a matter of perfectly adjusting pictorial elements to
each other within a compositional whole. Instead, the work
of art fulfills the "union of sense, need, impulse and action"
that Dewey identified as the chief motivational drive of the
live creature (Art as Experience_, p. 25). Yet this quality of
wholeness evades precise definition. The powerful coher
ence of aesthetic experience "cannot be described nor even
be specifically pointed at"; it "can only be felt" (p. 192).
A total, penetrating quality that is emotionally intuited rather
than cognitively known, the "undefined pervasive quality"
of the aesthetic is identical to "the spirit of the work of art"
(p. 193). As if uncertain himself, Dewey confesses that
"somehow, the work of art operates to deepen and to raise to
great clarity that sense of an enveloping undefined whole
that accompanies every normal experience" (emphasis
added, p. 195).
Readers might legitimately press Dewey to illustrate how
this sense of union is manifested in a particular work of art.
But the author's main goal-to develop a naturalist account
of the origin of works of art and to articulate a general theory
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of aesthetic experience-keeps him from analyzing specific
artworks in much detail. In any case, his emphasis on the ex
periential quality of that wholeness mitigates its being found
as a distinct property of any extant work of art. That coher
ence, when perceived, is "not the exclusive result of the lines
and colors" but of the "subtle affinity" between "what the
beholder brings with him" from prior experiences and the
artwork he views (p. 87). In aesthetic experience, those inter
ests and attitudes, meanings and values "fuse with the quali
ties directly presented in the work of art" (pp. 89, 98).
Here, though, a bifurcation seems to emerge between the
beholder's experience and the artist's intention with regard
to meaning-a split that Dewey never sufficiently resolves.
The viewer brings a prior history to bear in his present ex
perience of the artwork, and this history definitively shades
his understanding of what is meaningful to him about the
work of art. But is what the work of art experienced as
identical to its meaning?The question would seem central to
understanding what, for Dewey, constitutes the proper
domain of interpretation (a subject he never explicitly
broaches in Art as Experience). But the philosopher hedges
in answering. On the one hand, he asserts the meaning of
the work of art is what the artist intended. In the work of art,
there is a sense of "personally felt emotion guiding the se
lecting and assembling of the materials presented" (p. 68). It
is "saturat[ed] with conscious meanings" and a "deliberate
expression" (p. 23). Form, he argues, is the creator's par
ticular manner of "envisaging, of feeling, and of presenting
experienced matter" (p. 109). The implication is that it is the
creator's point of view that a beholder must perceive-and
interpret-in order to experience aesthetically. A painting
should not be used as a "spring board for arriving at [extra
neous but agreeable] sentiments" (p. 113); meaning is not
"a matter of association and suggestion" (p. 118). The cre
ator offers a proposal about existence that the viewer is
asked to judge as credible or not.
On the other hand, Dewey clearly values the meanings
attributed to the work of art by the viewer, even going so far
as to claim that each individual's experience creates a differ
ent work of art. Thus, he says, no two readers have the same
experience of a poem: indeed, "a new poem is created by
every one who reads poetically" (Art as Experience, p. 108).
"It is absurd," he goes on to say,
to ask what an artist "really" meant by his product: he himself would
find different meanings in it at different days and hours and in dif
ferent stages of his own development. If he could be articulate, he
would say "I meant just that, and that means whatever you or any
one can honestly, that is in virtue of your own vital experience, get
out of it. "
(Art as Experience, pp. 108-109)

But if it is true that whatever a beholder "get[s] out of it" is
the work of art's meaning, then it is hard to see how we
might settle right and wrong claims about what an artist ac
tually meant. Indeed, there would be no conflicting claims
as such to adjudicate since a report on experience is not a
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claim about meaning. A report on what one gets out of it
would not oppose another person's report; rather, it would
simply differ from it-with no consequences in terms of in
terpretation.
Intention, Meaning, and Interpretation. If meaning
is determined by the contingent experiences of a viewer, that
condition would seem to obviate the problem of judging
competing claims about what the work of art means. One
beholder's experience would just vary from another's. Since
neither would strictly be interpreting the work of art, no
basis would exist for agreement or disagreement. But as we
have seen, Dewey sidesteps the extreme implications of such
an anti-intentionalist position: art, he writes "is the imme
diate realization of intent" (p. 85).
Still, it would be useful to understand better what Dewey
means by intent, and how it is expressed. Notice that in the
line just quoted, Dewey does not say "an intent." The latter
formulation would have particularized intention by locating
it within an agent and ascribing to him an objective: the ex
pression of his or her own meaning. Here and in other in
stances in Art as Experience, Dewey downplays the agency
that creates the coherence he values in the work of art. (And
he never goes so far as to say that what is complete about the
artwork is its having a complete meaning that is fixed by its
author.) Partly, Dewey's resistance to the idea that meaning
is determined by the individual is a logical consequence of
his naturalistic theory of intention, in which an individual's
"own" meaning is not self-generated (as if autonomously
created), but rather is the result of a complex series of envi
ronmental interactions and intersubjective relations.
In a discussion of experience and expression, Dewey
offers a comprehensive account of the evolutionary origin
of conscious intent out of the basic interactions between
an organism and an environment. To clarify the nature of
"complete experiences," Dewey distinguishes impulses
the more or less mechanical reflex reactions of the organism
to environmental stimuli-from impulsions-the organic
needs that drive an extroverted "movement of the organism
in its entirety" toward the world (Art as Experience, p. 58). In
encountering resistance to the fulfillment of its "blind
surges," but in successfully transforming those obstacles
into advantageous conditions, the live creature "becomes
aware of the intent implicit in its impulsion" (p. 59). "Resist
ance," Dewey writes, "calls out thought" (p. 60). Insofar as
the live creature assimilates prior experiences and uses them
as a resource to confront new obstacles ("reviv[ing]" and
"re-creat[ing]" them in the process), obstructions become
the means or media by which the live creature expresses itself.
This model, however, poses certain difficulties to devel
oping a coherent theory of artistic meaning. When "sheer
internal pressure" drives the infant to cry, Dewey says, the
act cannot properly be understood as expressive (indeed, it
is not properly an act at all). As he becomes increasingly
aware of the determinate responses his cry elicits from
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others-and to the degree he begins t.o control his cry in an
ticipation of its consequences-he "grasps the meaning of
his act" (Art as Experience, p. 62). Meaning neither preexists
an interaction, nor is created ex nihilo, but rather always
emerges within and through an interaction. (The point of
Dewey's argument, like that of his student and colleague
George Herbert Mead, is that meaning is not self-determined
by an isolated, introspective ego, but is continuously socially
tested and evaluated.) It is only when he grasps how his acts
effect different results that the child begins to express him
self. If we extend this argument to the creation of a work of
art, it would seem to suggest that the artist's meaning is de
pendent upon the responses he elicits from his beholders or,
in other words, from how they put the work to use (which is
the same as saying it is dependent upon their experiences of
his artwork).
Furthermore, Dewey's example of the crying child calls
forth a distinction between an act that, from the point of
view of an observer, might appear expressive and one that is
actually or intrinsically expressive. To be genuinely expres
sive, the "child who has learned the effect his once sponta
neous act has upon those around him [must) perfor[m] 'on
purpose' an act that was once blind" (Art as Experience,
p. 62). The scare quotes around "on purpose" continue to
indicate the basic problem, and perhaps reveal a certain hes
itancy on Dewey's part. For if meaning is not determined by
the child, but is just the name we give to his developing
capacity to recognize effects, then we have a kind of com
promised on-purpose-ness. Meaning, instead of being self
generated, becomes a matter of manipulating one's acts to
achieve desired effects:
The child may now cry for a purpose, because he wants attention or
relief. He may begin to bestow his smiles as inducements or favors.
There is now art in incipiency.An activity that was " natural"-spon
taneous and unintended-is transformed because it is undertaken as
a means to a consciously entertained consequence.
(Art as Experience, p. 62)

Dewey goes on to discuss the opposition between true com
munication (the "artistic") and dissimulation or manipula
tion (the "artificial" or "artful"). But his discussion raises an
issue more pertinent than evaluating the relative sincerity or
fraudulence of an act. The issue has to do with what prop
erly constitutes interpretation. Although he is far from clear
on his stance, it is possible that Dewey is saying that inter
pretation should produce claims about what an agent,
through her artwork, means. On this reading, we would
expect Dewey's frank admission that what is being inter
preted-what we are targeting or making claims about in
interpretative activity-is what is intended, that is, the art
ist's meaning, not the artwork's effect on the viewer or the
viewer's experience.
However, many of Dewey's examples in Art as Experience
seem to divide meaning from an artist's intent. We might
take him just to be suggesting that intent, too, is a social phe-
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nomenon-not prior to or independent of meaning but in a
relationship of mutual determination to it. To do so would
constitute a rethinking of intention so that it is not identified
with an artist's or author's preformed mental plan but as
something embedded within a community.
When it has not simply been ignored, Dewey's aesthetics has
been met with both exaggerated hostility and exaggerated adu
lation. Benedetto Croce lambasted Dewey in print, but in 1966
Monroe called Art as Experience "the most valuable work in
aesthetics in English (and perhaps in any language) so far in
our century" (Beardsley, 1966, p. 332). What appears to be
called for-and what some philosophers have begun to under
take-are thorough analyses of Dewey's key terms that do not
fall into the circuitousness that characterizes his writing (an in
tentional strategy employed by Dewey to resist the ossification
of ideas and values). Michael Kelly, for instance, has recently
argued that attending to a model like Dewey's might help re
generate aesthetics by restoring its links to ethical and practical
life-links that are severed whenever aesthetics asserts its
judgments as if they are independent of values. With such anal
yses in hand, a more productive correlation of Dewey's aes
thetics with the actual history of art-with the conventions and
constraints that constitute the possibility for an artist's creative
expression-will be possible.
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DIALOGICAL ART. Dialogical Art refers to a distinct

genre within contemporary art practice in which forms of
dialogue and social exchange play a central role. Examples
include the work of the Viennese collective WochenKlausur,
Ala Plastica in Buenos Aires, Park Fiction in Hamburg, and
Rick Lowe's Project Row Houses incHouston (Kester, 2011).
This work is affiliated with a broader shift toward collabora
tive and performance-based approaches in contemporary
art that has been variously labeled "Relational" and ''Partic
ipatory" (Bourriaud, 1998). The term "dialogical" reflects
the interest among these artists in a model of aesthetic expe
rience in which the conventional relationship among artist,
artwork, and viewer becomes more reciprocal and inter
active. It also suggests the specific relevance of Mikhail
Bakhtin's concept of "dialogics" for the interpretation of
this work. While Bakhtin has exercised a significant influ
ence in the fields of literary and cultural studies, he has re
ceived far less attention in the visual arts (Deborah Haynes's
Bakhtin and the Visual Arts being a significant exception). In
part this can be attributed to the fact that Bakhtin wrote pri
marily about literary forms. However, Bakhtin's work, espe
cially his earlier philosophical research, can contribute much
to our understanding of contemporary collaborative or par
ticipatory art practices.
Dialogical Art practices challenge many of the herme
neutic conventions of contemporary art criticism and
theory. These conventions emerged out of the rapproche
ment between post-Conceptual art practice and Continen
tal Theory during the 1980s, which led to a reframing of
formalist models of art criticism associated with figures
such as Clement Greenberg. We might describe this shift

as marking a "linguistic turn" in the analysis of contempo
rary art, due to the important role played by literary theory
and semiotics, especially evident in the influence of journals
such as October (Krauss, 1980). Within this new paradigm
the work of art is understood as analogous to a poetic text,
"laying bare the device" of meaning through a "de-famil
iarizing" disruption of the viewer's habitual consciousness
of the world (Shklovsky, 1917). The work of the Swiss lin
guist Ferdinand de Saussure, as presented in Course on
General Linguistics, played a key role in the propagation of
this model (Saussure, 1913). It gave additional theoretical
coherence to an evolving set of beliefs within contempo
rary art practice in which society was viewed as a vast net
work of semiotic and ideological regulation that served to
constrain and determine our individual actions. Within this
system the only truly unconstrained form of expression
belongs to the artist, who is able to comprehend this to
tality, while at the same time devising forms of cognitive
assault and deconstructive exposition capable of bringing
others to some awareness of its existence. Because viewers
in this scenario are understood as receptive and unin
formed, awaiting enlightenment at the hands of the artist,
the artist's relationship to them is typically monological
rather than dialogical.
Bakhtin was familiar with Saussure's work through his in
fluence on Russian linguistics during the early twentieth
century. However, Bakhtin came to a very different set of
conclusions regarding the relationship between language
and human consciousness. In fact, Bakhtin was openly crit
ical of Saussure's decision to focus on the synchronically
fixed system of language, at the expense of the diachronic
unfolding of individual speech acts (his famous distinction
between langue, which is "essential" and parole, which is
merely "accessory" and "random"). In Bakhtin's view, this
marked a significant impoverishment of our understanding
of human creativity (Volosinov, 1929). By refusing to engage
with the complexity and messiness of actual human dia
logue ("our pernicious temporality," as Bakhtin describes
it) Saussure reiterates a longer tradition within modern
thought that sought to impose abstract theoretical principles
on the "un-repeatable singularity" of human existence
(Bakhtin, 1993, pp. 11-13). Here langue becomes the gener
ative locus of meaning, while individual speech can only
ever be an epiphenomenal expression of this larger structur
ing system. Bakhtin associates this outlook with what he
terms a "monological" understanding of human conscious
ness, which overlooks the transformative nature of recip
rocal, inter-subjective experience. In monological thought
the Other remains "only an object of consciousness," as
Bakhtin writes. "No response capable of altering everything
in the world of my consciousness is expected of this other.
The monologue is accomplished and deaf to the other's re
sponse: it does not await it and does not grant it any decisive
force" (Bakhtin, 1984, p. 293).

